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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate the macro—economicequilibria
of an economy in which credit contractshave both adverse
selection and incentive effects.The terms of credit contracts
include both an interest rate and a collateral requirement.We
show that in this richer model all types ofborrowers may be
rationed. Interest rates charged borrowers may moveeither pro
or counter—cyclically. If pro—cyclical shocks have a greater
effect on the success probabilities of risky techniquesthan on
safe ones, then the interest rate offered depositors mayalso
move counter—cyclically. Finally, weshow that the impact of
monetary policy on the macro—economic equilibriumis affected by
whether or not the economy is in a regime inwhich credit is
rationed.
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1. Introduction
In two earlier studies published in this Review, we developed atheory of
credit rationing. In our first study, we argued thatbanks might not. increase
the interest rate they charged even in the faceof an excess demand for
funds, for to do so might reduce their expected rateof return. Two reasons
were presented for the possible inverserelationship between the rate of
interest charged and the expected return to thebank:at higher interest
rates, the proportion of high risk borrowersis increased (the adverse
selection effect); and at higher interest rates, eachborrower has an incentive
to use riskier techniques (the moral hazard effect).In our second study, we
showed that a bank's commitment to cut off credit toborrowers who performed
badly has positive incentive effects.
Rationing might occur whether the banking system wascompetitive or
monopolistic. A profit maximizing monopoly bank mightnot charge the interest
rate at which, at the level of loans it decided to putforth, the demand for
loans equals the supply.Similarly, though there will, in general, exist a
Walrasian equilibrium, an interest rate at which thecompetitively determined
demand for loans equals the supply, this is not a competitiveequilibrium: no
bank is forced to charge the "Wairasian" interest rate.We showed that it may
pay lenders (banks) to lower theinterest rate charged borrowers below the
Wairasian level, even though in doing so an excessdemand for funds is
created.
We developed our theory as a market explanationof the widely observed
phenomenon of credit rationing. (As in so many areasin economics, there is
1not universal agreement about the extent or importance of the phenomenon.
We did not then, and do not now wish to engage in a debate over the
empirical evidence).Our theory did not require recourse to explanations
based on institutional considerations or government regulationB.Moreover,
our theory provided a simple, and we think convincing, explanation of certain
practices found in credit markets, such as red lining.
In writing our papers, we attempted to present the simplest models
generating credit rationing that we thought provided the basic insights into
the phenomena under study. Thought experiments with alternative versions of
the model had convinced us that our results were robust, and we thought it
would be apparent to the reader how they could be generalized in a number
of different directions.
Since then, two important sets of criticisms have been levied against our
theory. The first is that if the bank has available to itself instruments by
which it could increase its return and which, at the same time, would reduce
the demand for its funds, it would use these other (sometimes referred to as
non—price) instruments in conjunction with price (interest rate) instruments to
eliminate rationing.It is important to remember, in assessing this criticism,
that we did not contend that there would always be credit rationing, only that
there may be (under not implausible circumstances). Thus constructing an
example in which credit rationing does not occur (as several papers have
done) should hardly be viewed as a criticism of our theory.
The second criticism is that the result that, within a group of otherwise
identical individuals, some would receive credit and others would not, was not
robust.In our 1981 paper, we pointed out that if there were several
different risk categories, some would be completely denied access to credit;
others would not be rationed.Only for one group was it true that some
2received credit while others did not. Hence, given the special assumptions of
that model, as the number of groups in the economy increased, the extent of
this form of credit rationing decreased.
This criticism seemed important, because we would expect that in most
credit markets borrowers can be partitioned into many observationally
distinguishable groups. It does not require a deep theory to suggest that no
bank would lend to any groups from whom at any interest rate the expected
return was zero.' It is, however, not so obvious that there are groups for
which there is no interest rate at which loans can profitably be made,
especially since the expected gross return from projects undertaken by these
groups may exceed the expected gross return from projects undertaken by
groups that are getting loans; see Stiglitz—Weiss 1981, section IV.
It is true that in our 1981 paper as the number of groups increases,
holding the population constant, the number of excluded loan applicants that
are identical to borrowers who are getting loans goes to zero. However, there
may be a large group of similar loan applicants, some of whom obtain credit
and some do not. The sharp discontinuity in utility between those identical
borrowers who obtain credit and those who do not is simply translated into a
sharp discontinuity in utility between those similar borrowers who do obtain
credit and those who do not.
In this paper we make a stronger response to these criticisms.We
construct a simple model in which banks can (and do) use both collateral
requirements and interest rates to affect both the mix of applicants and the
incentives of successful loans appliants. Nevertheless, credit rationing occurs,
and indeed, every risk class of borrowing may be rationed, and rationing may
occur at every contract.The model we construct has several other
interesting features:there may exist pooling equilibria, i.e. equilibria in
3which high risk and low risk individuals borrow at the same terms (in
contrast with standard adverse selection models, in which, as Rothschild and
Stiglitz established, such equilibria cannot exist). While most studies to date
have analyzed moral hazard and adverse selection problems in isolation, we
show here how they can be combined, and that the interaction between moral
hazard and adverse selection effects may have important consequences.
Perhaps the most important feature of our model is its implications for
macro—economic policy and cyclical movements in real interest rates.In
particular we show that an expansionary monetary policy can be accompanied
by a rise in the average interest rate charged borrowers. Indeed a wide
variety of patterns of movements in real interest rates charged borrowers and
paid depositors and in the extent of credit rationing are consistent with
plausible hypothesis concerning cyclical movements in the returns to various
kinds of projects.
2. Credit Rationing and Collateral
In our earlier study, we were quite concerned with the use of non—price
instruments to eliminate credit rationing. We briefly explored several such
instruments, the availability and terms of future contracts, equity finance,
loan size and collateral.In this paper, we focus on the interactions between
interest rates and collateral requirements.
Increasing collateral requirements makes borrowers less willing to take
risks, which increases the return to the bank. On the other hand, increasing
collateral requirements may adversely affect the mix of applicants.In our
[1981] study we adduced several reasons for this. We showed that even if all
individuals had the same utility functions and the same opportunity sets,
wealthier individuals--those willing to put up more collateral--would undertake
riskier projects than would less wealthy individuals if there was decreasing
4absolute ri8k aversion. Subsequently, Wette showed that if opportunity sets
differ across borrowers, not even the assumption of risk aversion was
required.We also suggested that if large wealth accumulations were the
results of risk-taking plus luck, a disproportionately large fraction of the
very wealthy——those who would put up a large amount of collateral——would be
those who were risk loving (or at least not very risk averse): those who had
gambled and won.
These negative adverse selection effects may dominate the positive
incentive effects. Banks would then find that by increasing their collateral
requirements beyond some point, returns would actually be decreased.
The paper is divided into three parts. In Part I. we present the basic
analytics of the model. Part II. describes the market equilibrium, while Part
III. traces out the macro—economic implications.
Part I. Basic Analytics
This part is divided into two sections. In the first, we present the basic
model. In the second, as a prelude to Part II's fuller analysis of market
equilibrium with adverse selection and moral hazard, we analyze market
equilibria in which there is only a moral hazard problem.
3. The Basic Model.
Since our objectives are to construct a model of the credit market with
adverse selection and moral hazard effects, to show how prices and quantities
can both be used to convey information and still have credit rationing result,
andto examine some of the macro—economic consequences of such a model, we
construct the simplest such model, rather than the most general.
We assume that the representative borrower has two possible techniques,
a safe one and a risky one, denoted by superscripts s and r
5respectively. A project either is successful, yielding a return of
or ; or is unsuccessful in which case it has a return of zero.
The probability of success for the safe technique is p ,forthe
risky technique r < ,S We assume PRr < pSfS Each project costs $1
unit and this is more than the wealth of any borrower. Each borrower
can undertake at most one project.
The borrower has an initial wealth of W0this is of two forms:
collaterizable wealth, C0 and non—collateralizable wealth N0 .Thelatter
includes pensions, potential inheritances, and human capital. Wealth
not invested in the project yields a safe return of i .Thebank
requires the borrower to put up collateral C ,andto pay interest
on its loan of r .(Alternatively,the bank could require the borrower
to invest in the project. None of the results derived below would change if
the bank required the borrower to put up some of his liquid assets as
equity.) Thus, if the project is successful, the end—of—period
wealth of the borrower is2
(la) Y1
W + R —(l+r)





The expected utility of a borrower is thus
E{U} =U(Y1)p+ U(Y0)(l—p)
where we assume the borrower is risk averse, i.e.
6U' > 0 ,U"< 0
It is clear that, if the borrower had no choice of technique (say he
could only use technique r ),thenhis indifference curve between collateral
and interest would be quasi—concave, as depicted in figure 1.If the
borrower could only use technique a ,hisindifference curve would also
be quasi—concave, but the indifference curve through any point would be
flatter. The reduction in interest rate required to compensate the
individual for an increase in collateral is smaller, since the probability of
losing the collateral (the probability of a default) is smaller. The slope of
the indifference curve is just
2








The borrower will choose technique s or r ,dependingon which
gives him the higher expected utility. The borrower is indifferent
between the two along the locus defined by
(3) EUr • U(Y )r + U(y0)(l_Pr) =U(Y)p5 + U(Y0)(l—p5) • EU
where Y denotes the end of period wealth of a borrower, who
uses the risky technqiue and is successful; Y is defined
similarly. We note that Y0 ,endof period wealth if the project
is unsuccessful, does not depend on the technique used. The
locus of (C,r) combinations satisfying (3) is called the switch line.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
For simplicity, assume that a borrower who is indifferent among several
7techniques chooses the safest one. The switch line is positively sloped:
d U (y)(sr)
_i = >0. dC ,.s s r r U (x )p —U(Y )p
EUr=EUS
1 1
Above the switch line the borrower undertakes the risky technique;
on the switch line and below it where interest rates are low and collateral
requirements are high, the borrower uses the safe technique.3'4 Thus,
even though the bank cannot directly control the technique used by the
investor, it can indirectly control it: the bank knows precisely the
technique that will be used if it offers any particular contract (C,r)
Note that the indifference curves of the individual——taking into
account the changes in technique choices which occur as C and r change——
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
are neither quasi—concave nor differentiable. They appear as in figure 2,
with the indifference curve above the switch line being discretely steeper
below it, reflecting the higher probability of failure. (Recall front (2)
that the slope of the indifference curve depends on h' ratio of the
probability of failure to the probability of success and on the ratio
of U to U1 ,bothof which change discretely, and in the seine direction,
at the switch line.)
Banks are assumed to be risk neutral. The expected return to the bank,
denoted by ii, is
i i
(5) vp(l+r) +(1p)C
where p is the probability of success of the project undertaken. For
a given project, the iso—return curve is a straight line. At the switch
8line, however, there is a discontinuity in it, as depicted in figure 3•4
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Regardless of whether the individual uses the safe or the risky
technique the borrower's indifference curve is steeper than the bank's
iso—return locus, because the borrower is risk averse.5' 6
4.1. Equilibrium with moral hazard: identical borrowers
At any interest rate and collateral combination, there will be some
level of demand for loans and supply of funds. Assume that at the current
interest rate, collateral combination there is an excess demand for funds.
Conventional theory would have it that the interest rate would be bid up
(or collateral requirements lowered). This is true, until the contract
reaches a point which would induce borrowers to switch to the risky
technique. Then, the bank simultaneously increases the collateral
requirements and interest rate, moving along the switch line, until either
demand equals supply, or until C =C0
,themaximum feasible collateral.
Proposition 1. At C0 and at r(C ),thehighest interest rate
at which borrowers use the safe technique when C =C0
,theremay still
be an excess demand for funds: there may be credit rationing even though
the bank is choosing C and r simultaneously.
4.2. Moral hazard with two groups:Noadverse selection.
Assume now there are two types of individuals who differ only in their




9We first asse that banks can tellwhois of which type, so there is
no adverse selection problem. (We treat the more general case, where
thereis both an adverse selection and a moral hazard problem, in Parts ri
and III). The wealthier borrowers will act in a less risk averse manner,
provided there is decreasing absolute risk aversion.In this context, that
implies that the switch line for the rich lies everywhere below the switch line
of the poor. Thus, in Figure 4, we identify three regions: for contracts in
region X ,boththe rich and poor use the risky technique; in regionZ
both use the safe one; in region Y ,thepoor use the safe technique and
the rich the risky technique.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Forfuture reference, we record one further aspect of the comparison
of the rich and the poor, the indifference curve of the rich through
any point in the region X or Z (where they both use the same
technique) is always flatter than that of the poor; they need less of a
reduction in interest charges to compensate them for any increase in
collateral, given that they use the same technique. But in region
Y ,wherethe rich use the riskier technique and the poor the safer
one, the indifference curve of the rich may be steeper or flatter
than that of the poor.7
INSERT FIGURES 5, 6 HERE
We denote by contract {F} the contract with C =C
and the
highest interest rate, consistent with the poor using the safe
technique. Contract {G} is the contract with C =Crand the highest
10interest rate consistent with the rich using the safe technique.
(See figures 5 and 6.) We denote by v{K) the expected return to the bank
from contract K when a fraction x of those taking it are poor;
is the expected return when only the poor take it.8 In the obvious
notation,
v1{K} =v{K)and v0{K} =ti{K}
Since only rich borrowers can choose contract {G} we shall write
as v(G) .Itis apparent that v(F) may be either greater
or less than v(G) .Thecollateral requirement is higher at G than at F
and this increases the bank's expected return; but the interest rate may
be lower (because the rich borrower's switch line lies below that of the
poor) .
Theequilibrium may take on any of 5 forms: (i) Only the rich
obtain credit, and they are rationed; (ii) Only the poor obtain credit
and they are rationed; (iii). Both the rich and the poor obtain credit but
only the rich are rationed; (iv) Both the rich and the poor obtain
credit, but only the poor are rationed; (v) Both the rich and the poor obtain
credit, and neither are rationed.




Nrand z = .LetL(i) be the supply of funds,
where i is the real expected return to depositors (for simplicity,
depositors are assumed to be risk neutral);L' (i) > 0 :the supply of
fundsincreaseswith i .Competitiveequilibrium in the banking industry
implies that if the poor and rich both obtain loans, and have different
contracts, the two contracts must yield the same return, and the return
must be equal to i .Denotingthe equilibrium contract
for the rich by Er and for the poor by E ,wethen have
11(7) i =VrfEr}
=
Thus,if the maximum return obtainable from the rich, v{G}
exceeds the maximum return obtainable from the poor [{F}]
,andif
at i =vrl:G)
,thesupply of funds is less than the demand by the rich,
then only the rich will obtain loans, and not all of them will; banks will
not increase the interest rate, for to do so, would induce the rich
to undertake the risky project, lowering the bank's return. By the same
token, if the maximumreturnobtainable from the poor exceeds that from
rich, and the supply of funds at that return is less than total demand by
the poor, then only the poor will get funds. The contract offered will be
F and there will be rationing.
Whenthe return at Cexceeds that at F ,butthe demand for funds
bytherich is less than the supply forthcoming at i =v{G} ,then
both the rich and poor will obtain funds. There may, however, be rationing
of the poor. If there is rationing of the poor, the contract offered the
poor must be F .Hence,by (7) ,thecontract offered to the rich, which
we denote by H ,mustbe the contract that maximizes the rich borrower's
utility subject to the constraint that 'r' ={F}.InFigure 7
H is given by the intersection of an iso—return line through F (for
loans to finance the safe technique) with the rich individual's switch
line. This iso—return line has slope —(l—p5)/p5
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
The other cases may be analyzed in a similar way. We can suimnarize
our findings in the following Proposition 2
If there are two (or more groups in the population, with differing
collateraljzableweath and ifthe bank can ascertain to which group each
12borrower belongs, then the contracts offered different groups will differ.
Some groups may be excluded from the market; other groups will not be
excluded; and there may exist some group some of whose members obtain loans
and other do not.This group is referred to as the rationed group.
Tightening of credit (a reduction in the supply of funds) will be reflected
first in a reduction of loans made to the rationed group, until that. group is
entirely rationed out of the market; then in an increase in collateral
requirements and interest rates charged non—rationed groups; then in
rationing being imposed on one of the groups that was formerly not
rationed. 10
Note that it may be either the higher or lower interest rate contracts
which are rationed, and hence, a reduction in the supply of available funds
may either increase or decrease the average interest rate chargedborrowers.
PartII. Equilibrium withAdverseSelection and Moral Hazard
We nowassume that the banks know that there are poor and rich
borrowers,but cannot ascertain who is of which type. There is,
in other words, both an adverse selection and a moral hazard problem.
The choice of contracts may, however, reveal information about who
is of which type. Clearly, any borrower applying for a contract with
collateral requirements in excess of Cmust be rich. There may again
exist equilibria with or without rationing. We focus on the former.
The rationing equilibria in this economy may be characterized by
complete pooling (rich and poor borrowers receiving the same contract)
or by separating (at least some of the rich borrowers receiving loans
at different contract terms from those received by the poor borrowers).
Although we allow each bank to offer several different contracts, the
13equilibria we construct have the characteristic that each bank only
offers one contract."
Weassume that after each bank offers a contract(s), borrowers apply
for loans at every bank offering a contract that would increase the borrowers'
utility relative to not getting credit.(There is no cost of application but a
borrower cannot apply for a loan contract that requires more collateral than
the borrower has.) Each bank observes the contracts offered by the other
banks, and makes some inference concerning its expected return from each
contract it is offering. From this inference the bank determines the number
of loans it will make at each contract that it offered. Borrowers accept the
contract they are offered that gives them the highest expected utility.(If a
borrower is indifferent among several contracts it chooses each with equal
probability.)Finally, borrowers who have obtained loans make their
investment decisions.Loan applicants who have been denied credit may
deposit some or all of their liquid funds in banks. The interest rate paid
depositors is such that the aggregate supply of funds is equal to the
contracted quantity of loans. We assume that banks are small so that no
single bank can affecti •12
This part is divided into three sections. In the first, we analyse
thepooling equilibrium; in the second, a partial separating equilibrium,
while the final section discusses some extensions of analysis.
5. A Pure pooling equilibriu. with rationing
The first rationing equilibrium we shall consider is a complete pooling
equilibrium. We first showthatif there is a pure pooling equilibrium with
with rationing, it must be at {F) ,thecontract requiring of
collateral, and offering the highest interest rate at which the poor
14borrowers invest in the safe project. We shall assume that profits (per
dollar loaned) at F when the fraction of the poor equals or exceeds
z are higher than at any contract where the poor use the risky technique.
Hence, we can exclude every contract in region X of Figure 3 from
being a pooling equilibrium with rationing. Since (F) generates
higher profits than (other) contracts in region Y ,thosecontracts
also can be excluded as candidates for pooling equilibria with
rationing. Finally no contract in region Z can be a pooling
equilibria with rationing because contract {G} generates strictly
greater profits than do those contracts. Thus rationed borrowers
would be offered contract (G) and the bank making that offer would
make positive profits.
In the pooling equilibrium, i =v(F),andthe supply of funds is
thus L(v{F}) .Contract{F) is a rationing equilibrium if v(F) > v(G)
and L(v(F)) < N .Toshow that "all banks offering F" is a rationing
equilibrium, let us first consider a deviation from {F} by some banks
offering only a single contract other than {F} .Thereis no contract
that would attract only poor borrowers and would induce those poor
borrowers to use the safe technique. Thus, any contract requiring C
or less of collateral would generate a return less than v{F} .From
the definition of G ,anycontract requiring more than Cof
generates a return less than or equal to v{G) which is less than
v(F) .Consequently,since credit is being rationed, those contracts
would not be offered.
Let us now consider a bank deviating from this equilibrium by offering
several contracts. We shall assume that a bank can costlessly learn which of
of its contracts a borrower applied for and that this learning ability is
15coon knowledge. It offers several contracts in order to better distinguish
among applicants. A bank would deviate from offering (F)if it anticipated
making positive profits by doing so. In that case at least one of the
contracts must attract a proportion of poor borrowers greater than z
which implies that some other contract attracts a proportion of poor
borrowers that is less than z J3 This latter contract would generate
a return to the bank that is less than v{F} .Sincethe interest
rate paid depositors is i =v{F)
,thosecontracts would generate
losses to the deviating bank and hence would not be funded. Borrowers
knowthat the bank knows for which contracts a borrower applied, and will
use that knowledge to infer whether a borrower is rich or poor. Hence, by
applying for the contract that is designed to attract a high proportion of rich
borrowers, borrowers will anticipate being labeled rich and hence being denied
credit at the other contract(s) designed to attract the poor borrowers. Since
any contract(s) designed to attract the rich will not be funded, no borrowers
will apply for them.This argument will iteratively eliminate all but one
contract. Consequently, offering a contract pair is equivalent to offering only
a single contract, and as we have shown "all banks offering contract F" is
an equilibrium in this economy when banks can only offer a single contract.14
6. A partial pooling—partial separating equilibrium with rationing
There are also rationing equiibria in which some of the rich andpoor
borrowersborrow at the same terms, while some rich borrowers accept
contracts that are not chosen by any poor borrowers.
Suppose:
i) the rich borrowers prefer contract {G) to contract {F)
ii) v(F) < v(G) < v1(F)
iii) L(v(G)) < N
16There is a rationing equilibrium in which contracts (F) and {G) are
offered. All the rich borrowers apply for loans at every bank offering
either contract {G) or (F) .Arich borrower only accepts a contract {F}
offer if he is not offered a (G) loan. In equilibrium, the number of rich
borrowers getting G loans, NG ,issuch that the proportion of poor
borrowers, x ,amongthose accepting (F) loans satisfies v(F)
(By continuity and (ii) there always exists a value of x satisfying





If L(v(G)) > N ,NF
> 0 ,both{G) and {F) are offered,
and rationed; while if L(N(G)) < N ,only{G) is offered.
The reader can easily verify that when no loans are made at {G}
any single contract other than {G} or (F) generates a return strictly below
v(G) .Fromthe argument given above, for any bank offering several
contracts, at least one of those contracts will generate a return below v(G)
and will not be funded so that the "several contract strategy" again
degenerates into a single contract.
Note that while both rich and poor borrowers are rationed the rich
borrowersare more likely to get loans than are the poor borrowers. The
qualitative features of this equilibrium are quite general.
Note that this analysis differs from the earlier Rothschild—Stiglitz—Wilson
analysis in in four fundamental ways.First, we have both adverse selection
and moral hazard effects.Secondly, the indifference curves do not satisfy
the single crossing property(a condition whichseemed natural in the context
of the problems that they studied, but is not naturally satisfied here).
Thirdly, they did not admit (and their analysis did not require) the possibility
17of rationing; here we do.Fourthly, and as a natural consequence of the
presence of rationing, our equilibrium concept differs. The possibility—-indeed
necessity—-of the uninformed (the bank) turning down applications, and of the
informed (the borrower) turning down acceptances leads to an equilibrium
which is similar to the reaction equilibrium analyzed by Wilson (1977).15, 16
Note that while a pooling equilibrium requires the rich to prefer {F} to
(G} ,thepartially separating equilibrium requires that they prefer {G1 to
{F] .Figure8 illustrates the two possibilities.
INSERTFIGURE 8 HERE
Anatural question is whether the inequalities i'1{F} > v0G) > v{F}
and EU'{G)EU(F} canbesatisfied simultaneously. We know that with
constant absolute risk aversion, the switch lines coincide; hence
EUr{G}EUr{F) .With(sufficiently) decreasing absolute risk aversion
and (sufficiently) large differences in non—collaterizable wealth, the
switch line of the poor is moved down relative to the rich enough that
both v1{F} > z/{G) and EU"{G} > EUr{F} .IfCr is not too different
from C ,thesuccess probability of the risky project is sufficiently
less than that of the safe, and the proportion of the rich in the popula-
tion is sufficiently large, then v{F) < v{G} .Infigure 9 we depict,
for fixed collaterizable and non—collaterizable wealth of the poor and given
decreasing absolute risk aversion utility functions the set of collaterizable
and non—collaterizable wealth levels of the rich for which there may exist
a partially separating equilibrium.17
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
187. Extensions
There are four obvious extensions to the analysis: we could
allow the set of feasible projects to differ across borrowers; we
could allow each type of borrower to choose from several or a continuum
of techniques, we could allow for more than two types of borrowers,
and we could increase the number of instruments available to banks.
None of those changes in our model change our fundamental results
that there can be both separating and pooling equilibria with rationing,
and that in both the pure pooling and partial pooling equilibria all f3TS
ofborrowers may be rationed.
Differing Sets of Feasible contracts.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the first extension, allowing
the set of feasible technqiues to differ across borrowers, makes our results
easier to obtain. This can be seen by observing that the conditions for a
pure pooling equilibrium with rationing are certainly more readily satisfied
if the set of techniques available to the poor borrowers stochastically
dominates the techniques available to rich borrowers. In that case, a
lender would be less likely to increase collateral as a means of eliminating
rationing.
Continuu, of Projects.
Thesecond extension——allowing each type of borrower to choose from a
continuum of projects, rather than just two projects——requires a slight
change of notation, but otherwise does not substantially affect our
results. In the case of a pure pooling equilibrium, we define
r* as the interest rate at which the bank's expected return per dollar
loaned is maximizedwhenit requires C, of collateral on loans to a
*
proportion z of poor borrowers. If the return on contract r C}
19exceeds the maximum return on a loan to a rich borrower, and there is an
excess demand for credit when contract {r*,C) is offered, then there is
pure pooling equilibrium with all banks offering contract {r ,C}•18
Similar arguments can be made for extending our construction of partially
separating contracts and completely separating contracts with rationing to the
case when a continuum of techniques are available to borrowers.
Many types of borrowers.
Thethirdextension is to allow for several types of borrowers. In the
extremecase where there are several types of borrowers, with the same
amount of collateralizable wealth (C) but different non—collateral izab].e
wealth (or who differ in risk aversion for some other reason), we can
get credit rationing even without incentive effects. The mix of
applicants may still change adversely as we increase r ,atC
If the indifference curves of poor (safe) borrowers are flatter than those
those of richer (riskier) borrowers at the "equilibrium" contract, then
no contract can be offered that only attracts safe borrowers.
Our model, in which each type of borrower has a different endowment
of collateralizable wealth may also be directly extended to the case of
many types of borrowers. The analyses of pure pooling and the separating
equilibria with rationing follow directly from our analysis with two types.
In the pure pooling equilibrium all borrowers again choose contract {F)
In the case of a partial pooling equilibrium, we begin with the
wealthiest types, and assume that richer borrowers prefer the higher
collateral contracts that are offered, in equilibrium and feasible for
that borrower. The contract {G1} that maximizes the return for loans
the wealthiest borrowers determines the return v(G1) for all
other loans. The proportion of the wealthiest borrowers that get loans
20at contract {G1)is just sufficient to ensure that the bank's maximum
expected return on loans at a contract requiring collateral equal to the
collateralizable wealth of the next wealthiest borrowers is equal to
v(G1) .Denotingthat contract by {G2) ,theproportion of applicants
getting loans at contract {G2)is such that the maximum return from loans
at a contract requiring collateral equal to the collateralizable wealth
of the third wealthiest borrowers is also equal to v{G1) .Thisprocess
continues through all types. It is easy to specify a supply of loanable
funds and return functions for different types of borrowers that will
generate rationing of each type of borrower.
Additional instru.ents.
Collateral is just one of the instruments by which banks attempt to
select among applicants and to provide incentives for borrowers to under—
take safer projects. Other instruments face similar problems in combining
conflicting incentive/selection effects, or in any case, are sufficiently,
ineffective as to leave a residual incentive/selection problem of the kind
with which we have been concerned here.
Consider for instance the effect on our analysis from allowing banks
to demand equity from borrowers as well as collateral, by providing
smaller loans. If providing more equity reduces the amount of collateral
a borrower can provide, this additional instrument isredundant. The
return to a bank is not affected by the amount of equity participation
demanded by the contract. (See Stiglitz—Weiss [1985] for a proof of this
result.)
On the other hand, if the rich have some non—collaterizable
assets which can be used to finance part of the investment, but the poorhave
none, increasing equity requirements (reducingthe loan size) could have
21strong adverse selection effects)9
Part III. Macro—Economic Implications
In this part, we explore the macro—economic implications of credit
rationing. We address ourselves to three questions:(a) what are the
consequences of a shift in returns to different projects, such as might occur
over the business cycle? (section 8); (b) what are the consequences of a
shift in the supply of funds (section 9); and (c) what implications does the
fact that there is credit rationing have for monetary policy? (section 10).
Throughout the analysis, we assume a simple, general equilibrium version of
the model presented in the previous two sections. Thus, there are two types
of borrowers, each of whom has two types of projects. Traditional
macro—economic analysis has made extensive use of the concept of the
"representative" firm and the representative consumer. We would argue that
such models cannot adequately address those macroeconomic problems which
arise from imperfect information (where heterogeneity is central). The models
we present here repre8ent the simplest ones within which such problems can
be addressed.
8.Effects of Changes in Productivity. Business Cycles are marked by large
cyclical fluctuations in the likelihood of success of various projects. This is
reflected, for instance, in the marked cyclicity of bankruptcy rates. What
effects do these have on the extent and likelihood of credit rationing? We
argue below that our model is consistent with real interest rates charged
borrowers rising in recessions, while that paid depositors may fall, and
conversely during booms. More generally, our model is consistent with a
wide variety of patterns of cyclical movements in interest rates charged,
interest rates received and in the degree of rationing.
For analytical purposes, we need to distinguish two cases:
221. Balanced changes in success probabilities. We first assume that the
probability of success of both the safe and the risky techniques of
production are changed in the same proportion. For simplicity, we write
s srr p*=p,p*flp ,>O.
fivaries procyclically, e.g. P > 1in a boom, < 1 in a recession.






we immediately see that the switch line is unaffected. It thus follows that
if there is a pooling equilibrium, the rate of interest and the collateral
requirement will remain unchanged. But since the expected return to the
bank (and hence the interest paid to borrowers)
vp(l+r)+(l—p)C
(where p =zpS+(l_Z)Pr ,themean probability of success) is increased by
an increase in P ,thesupply of funds is increased.20 Hence, if the demand
for funds is unchanged,21 the extent of credit rationing is reduced.
Similarly, if we are in a (partially) separating equilibrium,
of the form described in section 6, then the contracts offered will remain
unchanged ({F} and {G}) .Sincethe return at G has increased, the
return at {F} must have increased. To see what happens to the fraction




(where rF and rG are the rates of interest in contracts {F) and {G}
respectively), from which it follows that
23dx/dfl =— [C—
C)/(pS*
r*)11 +rF —C)< 0
i.e. when increases a smaller fraction of the rich get loans at contract
{G) so that a larger fraction accept contract lrF) .Anequi—proportionate
increase in success probabilities decreases the value of collateral to the
lender. Because G loans demand more collateral than F loans, an increase
in P has a smaller effect on the profitability of {G) loans than of F}
loans. If both F and G loans are to continue to be made, the increased
profitability of F loans must be offset be an increase in the proportion
of rich borrowers choosing F loans, i.e. x must decrease. Since
i'G] is increased, the interest rate paid depositors is increased, and so
is the aggregate quantity of loans. Accordingly, both the proportion and
absolute number of G loans would fall as banks making F loans are able
to compete more aggressively for borrowers. Hence the average interest
rate charged and average interest rate paid both increase with (move
procyclicaily) 22
2. Unbalanced changes in success probabilities. Asuuune now, however,
that as the economy goes into a recession, risky projects have a dispropor-
tionate increase in their probability of failure, andina boom, they have
a disproportionate increase in their probability of success. Thus, we write
=6pS; r* = ,with(6—1) (P—i) < 0 ; (6P—l)(p—l) > 0
s r
op > p
We ask, what is the effect of an increase in 6 ? A change in 6 shifts the










i.e. the switch line shifts down in a boom as the risky project becomes
relatively more attractive, up in a recession. Thus, in the pooling
equilibrium, provided risky projects exhibit more cyclical volatility
than do safe projects, interest rates charged borrowers will move in a
counter—cyclical manner.
Even more surprising is the result that for sufficiently "unbalanced"
changes in productivity, the interest rate paid depositors may actually fall
in a boom. That is, recalling our definition of p as the mean probability
of success in a pooling equilibrium,











where is the change in the interest rate at contract (F)
induced by a change in 6 ,(givenby (10)). When v decreases and
rF decreases,the magnitude of credit rationing will clearly increase
in a boom.
Inthe partially separating equilibrium, the interest rates on both
contracts {F) and {G) decrease in a boom. But the decrease in the
interest rate at (G} may either exceed or be less than at {F}.23 As
before, the returns at {F1 and (G} are altered, but by differing amounts.
Hence, for the return at (F) to equal to the return on (G} ,thefraction
25of loans made at {G) will have to adjust, but it is ambiguous whether it. will
increase or decrease. Accordingly, although there may be some presumption
that the average rate of interest will decrease in a boom, it is possible that
if the proportion of the rich getting loans is decreased enough, then the
average rate of interest charged borrowers will actually increase.
It should also be clear that it is quite possible that as the economy
enters a boom rationing at {F) increases. This is particularly striking,
given that in these boom times the (social) productivity of the risky
technique is high relative to that of Bafer techniques, and only F loans
finance the risky technique.
As before, for sufficiently "unbalanced" changes in productivity, interest
rates paid depositors may fall, i.e.
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Our discussion in this section has been predicated on the changes in
productivity being sufficiently small that there is no change in regime. Of
course, with large productivity shocks, the economy may go from a situation
where there is credit rationing, to one where there is not, or conversely.24
Our analysis has also been predicated on the changes in projects being
the same for the rich and poor. So long as, for both groups, the risky
projects become relatively more attractive in a boom, the interest rates
charged on any particular contract will fall, but the mix of contracts may
26change in such a way as to decrease or increase the average interest rate
charged or paid.
It is thus apparent that our model is consistent with a variety of
patterns of cyclical movements of the extent of credit rationing and interest
rates paid and charged. Our model is in particular, consistent with the fact
that interest rates are far less volatile than the returns to equity(yr)
Interestrate may also be less volatile than they might be with perfect
information,25 and investment more volatile.
9. Changes in the supply of funds.
One of the reasons for our interest in credit rationing is that it raises
the possibility that the way that the central bank affects the level of
economic activity is not through changes in the interest rate but through
changes in credit availability. In this section, we trace out the consequences
of an upward shift in the 8upply of funds.26
We should emphasize that while a reduction in the available funds
reduces investments, the projects which are eliminated are not necessarily
those with the highest social productivity, i.e. those for which, in our model,
pR is highest. In particular, in the pooling equilibrium, the proportion of
good projects eliminated is equal to the proportion of bad projects, while in
the partially separating equilibrium, it is only the low collateral projects which
are eliminated.
As more credit becomes available, the number of projects undertaken
increases, but the average interest rate charged may remain unchanged (in
the pooling equilibrium) or may actually increase (in the partially separating
equilibrium). To see how an increase in the supply of loanable funds could
increase the average interest rate charged, observe that as the number of
loans increases, if the return on the contracts (F) and {G) is to remain
27the same, the number of loans made at (G} must remain unchanged; at that
margin all additional credit goes to the low collateral loans. But the interest
rate charged on the low collateral loans must exceed that on the high
collateral loans, and hence the average interest rate charged must increase.
A full analysis of the effects of a change in the supply of loanable funds is
contained in Appendix A.
There we note too that as the supply curve for funds shifts the nature
of the equilibrium (rationing at two contracts, rationing at one contract, no
rationing, etc.) may change.
10. Monetary policy, macro economic equilibrium, and credit rationing.
A natural question to be raised at this juncture is, how does our
analysis affect one's view of the role of monetary policy. There is a sense in
which our model conforms closely to traditional views, a sense in which it
differs markedly.
In traditional Keynesian analyses, an increase in "M" (money supply)
leads to a reduction in interest rates; the reduction in interest rates leads
to an increase in investment; and the increase in investment leads to a
higher level of income.27 The traditional analysis was based on a stable
relationship between money, income and interest rates, and is usually
motivated by some transactions story (ignoring, of course, the fact that most
transactions in dollar terms, are trades in assets, and there is no a priori
reason for a stable relationship between asset transfers and income
flows——on the contrary, there are strong a priori reasons that over the
business cycle this relationship might change). The traditional analysis also
obfuscated which interest rate was relevant, and ignored the fact that,
except in certain isolated periods (1932—35, 1980—85) real interest rates——which
modern economists would argue are the relevant ones——have hardly varied at
28all, and have been negligible relative to the expected returns demanded by
firms on their investments.
In our analysis, there are two critical links, between the money supply,
"M," and credit availability, A ,andbetween credit availability and
investment. Of course, if, as in simpler versions of our model,
A aM
the (flow of) available credit (A) is proportional to the money supply,and
I Ab
investment I is proportional to the supply of available credit, then,if






nationalincome increases with money supply, as in conventional monetary
models. This is the sense in which our model is similar to standardmodels.
Butit is equally important to note the differences. First, we would
argue that the link between "M" and "A" is likelyto change over the
business cycle, with an increase in money supply having a relativelyweak
effect on credit availability in recessionary periods. (For a moreextended
discussion of the link between M and A see Blinder and Stiglitz (1983)
and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).)
Secondly, we note that monetary policy can be contractionary
(expansionary) even though the average real interest chargedborrowers
changes little, or indeed decreases (increases). More generally, ourmodel
suggests that neither of the intermediate targets often proposedfor monetary
29policy——interest rates or money supply——may be closely related to what the
government is ultimately interested in, and accordingly these intermediate
targets should only be used with caution.
Thirdly, our model explains why monetary policy seems to have such
differential effects in different sectors of the economy,28 and why the
interest rate charged borrowers in different sectors may change at different
rates, or even in different directions. Our theory predicts that credit
rationing may be more important in certain sectors than in others and
indeed a decrease in the availability of credit would be largely felt in a few
sectors. Whether one wishes, as a matter of policy, to make those sectors
bear the brunt of the required macro—economic adjustments is clearly a
subject for debate.29
Fourthly, our model suggests that monetary policy may have a much
larger effect on investment if the economy is in a credit rationing regime
than if it is not.30
Fifthly, one of the reasons that monetary policy has effects when it
does is that other forms of credit are, for many borrowers, imperfect
substitutes for bank borrowing (because of the differential information of the
bank, and the problems associated with transferring information). On the
other hand, in the long run, non-bank credit is likely to become a better
substitute for bank credit; and to the extent that the government repeatedly
uses tight money policies to reduce investment, whatever advantages the
banking system has as a credit institution will be decreased; other
institutions will arise, and existing institutions will offer better substitutes
for bank credit. Thus, monetary policy is effective only if limited use is
made of it. This is a conclusion one would not reach within the more
traditional Keynesian model.
30There is one final reason that we would argue a macroeconomist should
be interested in credit rationing: Conventional expositions of Keynesian
analysis often stress the dichotomy between savings and investment, and the
fact that while households do the saving, it is firms that do the
investment.3' In the traditional neoclassical model, that dichotomy plays no
role: there is no corporate veil. In the presence of informational
imperfections of the kind that we have been concerned with here, which lead
to credit rationing (or to equity rationing, as in Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1986))the dichotomy between households and firms does become important.32
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have shown that there may be credit rationing, at all
contracts offered, even when collateral can, and is, used optimally (in
conjunction with the other provisions of the loan contract, in particular, the
interest rate charged) to differentiate among borrowers with differing
probabilities of default.
The idea that the terms of a loan -ntact might affect the mix of
borrowers (and hence the return to the lender) is, of course, not a new
one. More than 200 years ago, Adam Smith wrote that if the interest rate
was fixed too high
"...the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would
lent to prodigals and profectors. Sober people, who
will give for the use of money no more than a part of what
they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture
into the competition."33
But Adam Smith (and subsequent writers) did not attempt to analyze the
equilibrium in competitive capital markets, under such circumstances. This
has been the major objective of this as well as our previous studies.
We have shown that a central consequence is that there !Y be credit
3'rationing. Credit rationing canoccurif three conditions are satisfied:
1.There must be some residual uncertainty (Information imperfection),
after lenders employ whatever means they have at their disposal to
differentiate among applicants and to control their behavior.34
2. The adverse selection/adverse incentive effects of changing interest
rates or the non—price terms of the contract (collateral, equity, etc.) must be
sufficiently strong (at some values of the relevant variables) that it is not
optimal for the lender to use these instruments fully to allocate credit.
3. The supply of funds must be such that at the Wairasian equilibrium
(where demand equals supply, taking into account the use of non-price
instruments), the expected returns to the lender are lower than for some
other contract, at which there exists credit rationing.
The first condition, we would contend, is virtually always satisfied, but
the second and third conditions may or may not be:33 we believe that credit
markets are sometimes, but not always, characterized by credit rationing.
When credit rationing is observed, it may be caused by other factors (such
as legal restraints on the level of interest rates charged). But there are
circumstances in which credit rationing occurs at interest rates below legally
imposed ceilings. We believe that understanding the kinds of informational
imperfections on which we have focused in this paper is essential to
understanding credit rationing under these circumstances.
We have argued further that the mechanism by which and the extent to
which monetary policy may affect the macro—economic equilibrium may differ
when the economy is in a credit rationing regime and when it is not.
Developing the appropriate specifications for testing the hypotheses advanced
in this paper remains a task for future research.
32NOTES
1. The type of credit rationing with which we have been concerned should
also be distinguished from the phenomena that for any borrower the
interest rate charged is an increasing function of the amount borrowed.
This would be true with full information, provided that as the individual
borrows more, the likelihood of default increases. It is also true if
the {interest rate, loan size) schedule serves as a self—selection
device. Our theory attempted to explain why some individuals could not
borrow funds at any interest rate, though similar individuals seemed
to have access to funds.
2. More generally, we can write income as a function of R a
Y =max(W+R—(l+r),w— C)
3. Recall that is independent of technique, while yr> ys
4. Formally, at the switch line, the choice of technique is undefined (the
individual is indifferent as to which technique he employs). Accordingly,
we could have assumed that on the switch line the borrower is under-
taking the safe project with some probability. For each point on the
switch line there is some probability of undertaking the safe
project, such that the expected return to the bank is v
In this sense, then, the iso—return curve to the bank, though
peculiarly shaped, is not discontinuous. It follows the switch line




which is always less than the slope of the indifference curve given by
(2) for Y1 > and U" < 0
6There are two possible forms competitive contracts may take. One entails
negative collateral, so long as the borrower risks some of this own
or zero collateral, when the bank provides all the capital for
the project. In this contract the bank is acting effectively
as insurance agent.
The other entails positive collateral. These contracts entail a
collateral requirement and an interest rate such that the individual
is just indifferent between using the risky and the safe technique,
i.e. it must be on the switch line. In the subsequent discussion,
we focus on the latter contracts.
7. Using (3), we note that while for the rich, (l—p)/p is higher,
Ub lU'1
may be smaller.
8. To focus on the incentive effects of contracts we assume that
v0(G) > Pr'Rr and v1(F) >PrRr ,sothat banks prefer to makesafe
Niloans at either F or G to risky loans at contracts in which
the banks gets all the returns.
9. Obviously, if the interest rate at G is greater than at F (or
not much less) then bank profits at G exceed those at F .Increases
in the collaterizable wealth of the rich have two effects: the switch
line is shifted down, which decreases the bank's profits; while the
direct effect of more collateral serves to increase the bank's profits.
The net effect is ambiguous, and depends on the extent to which
(absolute) risk aversion decreases with wealth and the relative
differences between the collateralizable and non—collateralizable
wealth of the rich and poor. If there is constant absolute risk
aversion, then the switch lines would coincide; by continuity, with
slightly decreasing absolute risk aversion, the bank's return at G
always exceeds that at F ,butthe converse will be true if there is
strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion, and the difference in
non—collateralizable wealth between the rich and poor borrowers
is large.
10. In the case where the return to the loans to the poor exceeds the
maximal return to the rich and where L(v(F)) > N there may exists
an equilibrium with rationing only of the rich. In this equilibrium,
="rand the rich are offered contract G .Thepoor are offered
that contract along their switch line with the same expected
return, as G i.e. entailing lower r and lower collateral than at {F}
11. There may, of course, also be equilibria in which each bank offers
several contracts. We do not investigate here equilibria in which
banks offer several contracts.
rr rr
12. We continue to assume a) v{G} > p Rand b) (F} > p R .For
most of our analysis only one of those inequalities is required. (Often
only the weaker condition that i'1(F) > p Ris required; however,
the exposition is simplified if we assume (a) and (b) hold throughout.)
The reason inequalities (a) and (b) are required is that, if those
inequalities were vio1ated banks might profitably offer contracts
with interest rates rR —1and zero collateral that induce
borrowers to use the risky technique. Because we are concerned
with the incentive effects of contracts, extensive discussion of those
cases would be tangential to the main focus of our analysis.
We also continue to assume for simplicity that the borrower
risks none of his own capital, other than that demanded as
collateral by the lender. But see below, Section 7.
13. The contract set must include at least one contract which is
preferred by the rich to {F) ,forwe have already shown that
there is no contract which will increase bank returns given that
E(Ur) =E(U'{F)
14. Note that we implicitly assume banks cannot commit themselves
at the time they annomce the set of contracts they offer to
N2a particular allocation of funds or acceptance rate among the various
contracts. This assumption seems natural since neither banks nor
borrowers would be expected to know the out of equilibrium allocation
of funds.
15. Formally, while the standard (Rothschild—Stiglitz) selection model
can be formulated as a two stage game with the uninformed moving
first, our model here is of a five stage game, the three extra stages
are the acceptance by the bank (the uninformed) of the offers
of the informed; the acceptances of the borrowers (the informed)
of the offers of the bank (the uninformed), and the choice of a
technique by the borrower.
16. The notion of reaction equilibrium was also discussed by Rothschild—
Stiglitz (1976). The concept of reaction equilibrium was criticised
both for its ad hocery (the set of admissible reactions being
arbitrarily specified), for its incompleteness (it being a dynamic
concept within a static model), and for its inconsistency in spirit
with competitive analysis. We analyzed the Nash equilibrium of a
simple dynamic model, in which the "reactions" are fact derived.
17. The proof procedes, first by expressing the contract {G) as a




EU {G} =EU{F) can be viewed as defining implicit equations
between W and C .Weevaluate the derivatives (dW /dC
at {c1W} ,andshow that the equal return locus lies below
the equal utility locus, and both loci have positive, finite
slopes. For a proof, see J.E. Sitglitz and W. Weiss1 "Credit
Rationing with Collateral" Bell Core mimeo, August 26, 1985.
18. There is also a (trivial) separating equilibrium with rationing in which
only contract {G) is offered, and some, but not all, of the rich
borrowers get loans at (G} .Thepoor borrowers would, of course, be
unable to get loans.
19. In Stiglitz—Weiss [1981] we also argued, in the context of a simple
two—period model, that reducing loan size may have strong adverse
incentive effects.
20. We continue to assume that L' (i) > 0
21. Of course, in practice, over the business cycle, this is likely
to vary markedly as well, and whether in practice the extent of
rationing increases or decreases in booms depends on the relative
movements of the demand for funds and the supply. Either is,
on a priori grounds, possible.
22. This assumes that the number of potential investor—borrowers remain
unchanged. If there is a "balanced" increase in the supply of investors,
then it is possible that the absolute number of G loans would increase
and indeed, even that the proportion of G loans increases. The latter
N3occurs if the increase in such borrowers is so large that x falls even
as the proportion of G loans increases
N dNdN N p cbc p GG dN N
N _NG' x N NGN_NGN N_NG
x can decrease even when NG increases,
23. From (10), if the absolute risk aversion of the rich and poor were
the same (drF/dö)IRUrEU5 < (drG/dä)IEUrEUs .Butsince the poor
are more risk averse than the rich just the opposite may be true.
24. In our model, with no demand elasticity, a sufficiently large increase
in productivity combined with a sufficiently large elasticity of supply
of funds may eliminate credit rationing, provided Idä/dfllis not too
large.
25. This is particularly clear for the case of balanced changes on
productivity, when interest rates do not change at all.
We can write the number (value) of loan
N applicants as a function of fi and i:N(i,fl) .Let be
the elasticity of N with respect tofi ,let be
minus the elasticity of N with respect to i and be the
elasticity of loan supply with respect to i .Theninvestment
with perfect information will be less volatile if the percentage
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isless than that with imperfect information. In the pooling equilibrium






This will be true if Cis small and is small, while both savings
and investment are relatively interest inelastic.
26. For analytical purposes, we assume throughout this section that there
are no changes in the set of available techniques.
27. This "dynamic" interpretation ignores the fact that the interest rate and
N4income are determined simultaneously in the standard model.
28. Though in principle, the interest elasticity of different sectors
may well differ, so that a given change in the interest rate would
have a different impact on different sectors, the interest elasticity
itself should be derived from the demand elasticities and production
function of the different sectors; we doubt that the observed patterns
of responses can be accounted for within the traditional models.
29. There are some grounds for believing that if the impact of monetary
policy could be spread over more sectors——with the effect on each
sector being reduced——then we would see smaller fluctuations in
employment (but not necessarily in hours worked) in response to macro-
economic adjustments (see Baily [1979)).
30. Our model is thus consistent with the observation that in recessionary
periods, monetary policy often seems to have little effect (because
of the excess liquidity in the banking system at the time, monetary
policy has little effect on the availability of credit; and since
credit is not constrained, monetary policy can only attain its
effects through the interest rate mechanism) while in other times,
the imposition of a tight monetary policy seems to have large effects.
31. Obviously, this is not so true of small unincorporated businesses, but
these account for a relatively small fraction of total investment.
32. Indeed, in our analysis, the inability of funds within the corporate
sector to move easily from one firm to another——because of informational
imperfections——is perhaps no less important than the difficulties of
moving funds between the corporate and the household sectors.
33. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776.
34. This includes not only the self—selection mechanism which have been
the focus of this paper, but also auditing (direct examination).
35. We can show that if the first two conditions are satisfied, then there




Comparative Statics Analysis of Effects of
Changes in Supply of Loanable Funds
Case I.
Richborrowers prefer contract (F] to (G) ,andi'(G) > v(F) .(i)
Let us suppose that initially there is an excess demand for credit (by rich
borrowers) at contract G: L(v(G)) < Nr The equilibrium is then
characterized by only contract G being offered.(ii) Now let us consider
an outward shift in the supply of loanable funds function so that
L(v(G)) > Nr Banks will then compete for rich borrowers by moving
the contract they offer rich borrowers southwest along theswitch line
ofthe rich borrowers. (For expositional simplicity, we restrict our
analysis through the appendix to cases in which the high collateral contract
requires more than Cof collateral.) This movement continues until a
contract is reached such that "(H) =v(F) .(iii)Suppose rich borrowers
prefer contract (F) to (H] .Thenfurther outward movements in the supply
of loaiiable funds function will cause contract F to be offered;
the number of contract F loans offered will be such that when all
rejected rich borrowers get credit at contract H the quantity of loans
made is equal to L(v(H)) (iv) Further outward shifts in the
loanable funds function will first eliminate rationing at contract F
There will then be a complete pooling equilibrium. Still further increases
in supply will result in a southwest movement along the switch line of
Althe poor borrowers. We denote this contract by F' Cv) If the utility
function of borrowers is characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion,
the indifference curves of the rich borrowers become flatter as they become
better off. Consequently, there may be a supply function of funds for which




the rich borrowers are indifferent between the high and low
collateral contracts which would yield the same return to the bank.
At that point further outward movements in the supply of loanable
funds function would be accompanied by some rich borrowers choosing
high collateral contracts in preference to low collateral contracts.
The greater is the proportion of rich borrowers choosing the high
collateral contract, the greater is the proportion of poor borrowers
among those choosing the low collateral contract, and consequently
1. e note the possibility that the indifference curve through
F for the poor individuals may be flatter than that of the
rich (at higher levels of collateral). In the standard Rothschild-
Stiglitz analysis, this pooling equilibrium could then be broken.
In our model, however, a bank that offered such a breaking contract
would know that the other banks would recognize that the
proportion of poor (safe) borrowers taking up their contracts
would be less than ,andhence that their expected return
would be less than v (F) .Theywould refuse to makeloanoffers.
(It should be apparent that our model can be thought of as a
formalization of what is sometimes called the Wilson—equilibrium).
A2FI
thehigher is the return on that contract. The contract pairs, and choices
of rich borrowers would then be such that rich borrowers are indifferent
between the contract being chosen, and banks niale the same return on the
two contracts, i.e. the contract pairs will lie on the indifference curve
of rich borrowers through the high collateral contract, and the ratio of
rich borrowers choosing the high collateral contract in preference to the
low collateral one will be such as to equate the return to a bank from
the two contracts.2
Case II.
Rich borrowers prefer contract {G} to contract (F) ,v(G)> v(F)
and L(L'(G) < N .Initially,only G is offered. As the supply of
fundsfunction shiftsoutward, eliminating rationing, the contract
being offered moves along the switch line of the rich borrowers until
some contract H is offered such that v(H) =
Sincethe rich prefer (H) to {G} to (F) ,theyprefer (H) to
(F) ; if contract {F} is offered as well as contract {H) ,contract
(F) is only chosen by the poor borrowers. Further outward movements
of the loan supply function would first cause an increase in the
number of loans made at contract F ,andthen southwest movements
of both the low and high collateral contracts along the switch lines
of the poor and rich borrowers.
2. That is v(F) =v(H)for xz and EUr(F) =EUr(H)
A3V
CaseIii.
Finally, let us consider the case where rich borrowers prefer
contract G to F but v(F) > v(G) ,andL(v(F)) < N .Then
the equilibrium is characterized by only contract F being offered.
Starting at this equilibrium, outward shifts in the supply of loanable
funds function first reduce and then eliminate rationing at F
Further outward shifts cause banks to move the contract they offer southwest
along the switch line of the poor borrowers until contract F'satisfying
v(F' )= v(G)is reached. At that point, if the rich borrowers prefer F'
to G ,asingle contract continues to be offered and outward shifts of the
loan supply function continue to cause southwest movements of the contract
along the switch line of the poor borrowers.
On the other hand, suppose the rich borrowers prefer G to F'
Consider a contract F" along the poor's switch line, such that
v1(F") =v(G).Ifrich borrowers prefer Gto F" ,thenboth contracts
would be offered in equilibrium. All the rich borrowers choose G
and all the poor borrowers choose F" Further outward shifts in
the loan supply function cause southwest movements of the two
contracts along the switch lines of the poor and rich. At all points,
the contracts generate the same return. Only poor borrowers
choose the low collateral contract. Rich borrowers choose the
the high collateral contract.
If the rich borrowers prefer F" to G then some contract Fl lying
on the switch line of poor borrowers between F'and F" is offered such
that the rich borrowers are indifferent between this intermediate contract
and contract G .Inequilibrium, the proportion of rich borrowers choosing
G when offered Ft is such that the two contracts generate the same returns
A4* .p*
tobanks. Further outward shifts in the supply of funds function would then
cause southwest movements along the two switch lines. The contract pairs lie
on the same indifference curve of the rich borrowers. The proportion of rich
borrowers choosing the lowcollateralcontract is such that the two contracts
generate the same expected return to a bank.
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Theory, 16, 167-207.</ref_section>Indifference Curves
With a single activity, indifference curves are
downward sloping and couv.
A rich individual has a flatter indifference curve
than a poorer individual; he requires a greater
reduction in the interest rate to copeneate hi for
an increase in collateral.
Similarly, of two individuals with the same wealth, the one









The switch line gives those {interest rate, collateral}
pairsat which the individual isindifferent between
undertakingthe safe and risky projects. It is up-
ward sloping.










(X)NTRACTS WITHONLY MORAL HAZARD
The bankeitherprovides insurance (negative or zero
collateral) as in3b, or requires sufficient colla-





























F is the optimal contract to the poor
C is the optimal contract to the rich
If there exists a pooling equilibriim, it must lie at F.
I
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Cp Cr CAbove rnoone borrows
x —fractionof those borrowing at C, who are poor
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Equilibriumwith rationing of the poor (at F) but
not the rich (who are offered contract H).
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Aboveequal utility locus, the rich prefer C to F.
Above the equal return locus, \{ F) >v(C). Near
Ic, W,the equal return locus lies below the Lpp
eual utility locus. The shaded area gives, for
fixed collaterizable and non—collaterjzable wealth
of the poor, the set of collateralizable and non—
collaterizable wealth levels of the ricb for which
thereaust exist apartially separating equilibrium.